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an individual, 
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF I 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Respondents' briefs fail to address the real issues on appeal. Summary judgment 
against Rocky Mountain was improper as the District Court did not address the initial purchase 
agreement between Rocky Mountain and Lund. This agreement was not and cannot be impacted 
by any agreement with Triad as it was an independent agreement. 
Additionally, once removed from consideration with the Triad agreement, summary 
judgment for Lund was improper on the Fraud claim by Rocky Mountain. The statements made 
by Lund were possible in the agreement between Lund and Rocky Mountain and should not be 
excluded pursuant parole evidence as there was no written document between Lund and Rocky 
Mountain. 
The District Court erroneously found Rocky Mountain in breach of contract. This error 
stems from the improper interpretation of the contract by the District Court to require a payment 
before April 20, 2006. 
The District Court erroneously relied on the testimony of Vickie Turner for the purposes 
of verifying delivery and thereby acceptance of the contract. Ms. Turner's testimony on the 
matter is seriously flawed and contradicted by overwhelming evidence and even Triad's 
representative's own testimony. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 2 
ARGUMENT 
In each of the briefs provided by the Respondents in this matter, the Respondents attempt 
to complicate the issues on appeal and offer irrelevant arguments in an attempt to have the 
rulings of the District Court upheld. The following argument will address each Respondent and 
the issues on appeal relevant to that Respondent individually to clarify the questions presented. 
Issues on Appeal with G. Alan Mcrae d/b/a Lund Machinery 
Summary Judgment Against Rocky Mountain 
In Rocky Mountain's Third-party Complaint against Lund, Rocky Mountain claims both 
a breach of contract against Lund both as an individual and as an agent for Triad. (Record pg. 62) 
This is additionally supported by the District Court's statements on the first day of trial when that 
Court stated, "Their motion only went to whether they were parties to the Triad contract." 
(Transcript pg. 44) Lund now attempts to state that the Motion for Summary Judgment applied to 
all claims. (Respondent's Brief pg. 7) However, Lund ignores the remainder of the statements 
made during the hearing on its Motion for Summary Judgment where it clearly stated that the 
motion was on agency. In that hearing, Lund also stated, " ... quite simply, we should be given 
summary judgment on this breach of contract claim for the simple reason that Lund Machinery 
was not a party to this contract between Triad and Mr. Blittersdorf." (Transcript pg. 5.) 
In granting summary judgment for Lund, the District Court, in its original order stated 
that Lund was not an agent for Triad, and therefore summary judgment would be granted. (see 
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generally Memorandum Decision and Order, Record pg. 75) In that order, after discussing the 
various requirements under the law and rules for summary judgment, the District Court stated, 
"The contract between Rocky Mountain and Triad is clear and unambiguous. Lund is not a party 
to it, and assumed no obligations under it." Id. at 80. The District Court would continue to rule 
that Lund was not an agent of Triad and therefore could not have any obligations under the 
contract between Triad and Rocky Mountain. Id. Throughout the entire decision, the District 
Court only addresses the Triad contract and Lund as an agent. 
As argued in Rocky Mountain's opening brief, an agreement was reached between rocky 
Mountain and Lund before the Triad contract came into existence. The agreement is 
acknowledged by Lund in its reply brief when it states, "In 2006, Lund agreed to sell the 
previously rented forklift to Rocky Mountain." Respondent's Brie/pg. 2. The purchase was to be 
financed through a third-party, Triad. In the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Lund 
states, "All we did was sell him the vehicle. We're not a party to the transaction between Triad 
and Mr. Blittersdorf. All we did is we got paid for the equipment." (Transcript pg. 24.) 
The start of the entire issue is when Lund and Rocky Mountain agreed to tum the 
previous lease into a purchase. (Record pg. 75.) This agreement included the credit for a portion 
of the lease payments and the additional purchase of the jib boom. Id. pgs. 75-76 This agreement 
was reached before any agreement or issue with Triad. Id. There were only two parties, Rocky 
Mountain and Lund. This agreement was not discussed or decided in the Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by Lund. Evidence of this agreement could not be excluded based on the parole 
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evidence rule as requested by Lund because there was no written agreement. Lund is not excused 
from this agreement because of Triad, because it was reached without involvement from Triad. 
The District Court, in entering its decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment did not 
consider this separate agreement with Lund. The District Court clearly said so in the decision and 
again at trial. That Court only decided that Lund was not an agent for Triad. In doing so, the 
District Court left the breach of the original agreement to sell and to buy the forklift and jib still 
pending. 
Present Facts or Future Performance 
Lund's arguments on the fraud issue of the statements made being present facts or future 
performance also fail on the same reasoning as stated above. These statements were made 
between Lund and Rocky Mountain, and were not communicated by Triad. This being the case, 
Lund cannot then try to have the statements excluded based on the parole evidence rule. There is 
no written document between Lund and Rocky Mountain and therefore parole evidence is non-
existing. Lund's arguments on the present facts or future performance also fail once removed 
from the contract with Triad. 
Issues on Appeal with Triad Leasing & Financial, Inc. 
The District Court Committed Error in Finding Rocky Mountain in Breach 
Triad claimed that Rocky Mountain breached the contract by not providing required 
payments pursuant to the contract. (Record pg. 10.) In its letters to Rocky Mountain and at trial, 
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Triad would argue that the breach occurred by Rocky Mouutain not providing the security 
deposit at the time of signing the contract, calling it an "upfront payment." (Transcript pgs. 77, 
116-117.) The District Court found Rocky Mouutain had breached the contract by not providing 
this payment. (Record pg. 92.) This was again expressed to Rocky Mouutain in the letter sent 
from Triad on April 11. (Transcript pg. 126.) As is clearly and unambiguously stated on the 
contract, and by Triad at trial, the initial payment was due on April 20, 2006. (Record pg. 13, 
Transcript pg. 131.) At the time of signing the contract, or at the time of accepting the contract, 
there was no payment due. Id Triad noted that the contract itself stated a onetime payment of 
zero was due upon acceptance of the contract. (Transcript pg. 150.) 
By not having a payment due till April 20, 2006 and no payment due at the time of 
signing the contract or accepting it, Rocky Mouutain could not have breached the agreement by 
not providing required payments at any time prior to April 20, 2006. However, Triad claimed 
and the District Court fouud that Rocky Mountain breached the contract prior to the April 20, 
2006 date for not providing a security deposit. ( Triad's Demand letter claiming breach on April 
11, 2006-Transcript pgs. 116, Record pg. 91- Rocky Mouutain's $5,600 check did not clear the 
bank and this was not remedied.) 
It is also clearly laid out in Rocky Mountain's brief how the District Court committed 
error in finding the contract accepted by Rocky Mountain based solely on the testimony of Ms. 
Turner. As noted in the opening brief, Ms. Turner testified that she could not verify exactly who 
called her, saw there was no jib boom in the verification photo and that she verified if :they have 
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received their 1997 Hi Reach Forklift. (Transcript at 202.) It is clearly erroneous to rely on this 
one person's testimony when the volume of evidence suggests the exact opposite. Even Mr. 
Wakefield stated that only "most of' the equipment was delivered. (Transcript pg. 174.) 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, there were two agreements reached. The first is the agreement between Lund 
and Rocky Mountain for the purchase of the forklift and the jib boom. This agreement occurred 
prior to any involvement with Triad and should be considered separate from that agreement. The 
second agreement resulted in Triad financing Rocky Mountain's purchase. 
The District Court failed to adequately address the initial agreement between Rocky 
Mountain and Lund. The District Court attempted to summarily dismiss this claim by referring to 
its previous order granting Lund's Motion for Summary Judgment on Lund as an agent for Triad. 
As noted in this appeal, not only was that decision by the District Court clearly erroneous based 
on the prior decision, the decision, if taken on the evidence, is erroneous based on the valid 
claims from Rocky Mountain. Summary Judgment was improper. 
The District Court also improperly interpreted the Triad lease agreement in finding a 
payment due before April 20, 2006. Based on the document and testimony at trial, there clearly 
was not default even possible based on Triad's claims until April 20, 2006. Triad's claim of 
breach was premature and not supported by the evidence once there is a proper interpretation of 
the contract. 
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These erroneous errors by the District Court denied Rocky Mountain justice and should 
therefore be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of May, 2009 
Larren K. Covert, Esq. 
Of Swafford Law Office, Chartered 
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